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Underthe classicalgold standardthe levelofpricesandeconomicactivity
depended to a considerable extent on the supply ofnew gold. This paper
is about the stability and elasticity of that function. Periodically, the
supply of gold was disturbed by a wide variety offactors: the discovery
and subsequent exhaustion ofgold fields, technological change in mining
andextraction, governmentpoliciestowardmining, andwars andrevolu-
tions. Below I survey these disturbances and answer some important
questions aboutthem. Whatkindofdisturbancewas themostimportant?
How significant were the disturbances in terms of their effect on the
world's stock of monetary gold? Perhaps of most interest is whether
major disturbances were really lagged responses to changes in the real
price of gold. In particular, to what extent can the great increase in the
supply of gold at the turn of the century be more properly viewed as a
movement along a long-run supply curve than as the product of an
accidental, if fortunate, series of shifts in the supply curve?
The notion that changes in the real price ofgold influenced the subse-
quent supply ofgold, and hence the general level ofprices, is hardly new.
Manyreferencescould begiven, includingFriedmanandSchwartz (1963,
p. 188) who noticed the broad trends in the relationship between in-
creases in the real price ofgold and increased supplies, Cagan (1965, pp.
60-67) who offered some qualitative evidence on the relationship, and
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Bordo (1981, p. 10) who showed that deviations from trend in the
purchasing power of gold were significantly correlated with later devia-
tions from trend in the world's supply of monetary gold. My intention
here is to chart in detail the channels through which increases in the real
price of gold influenced the supply. The exercise, I hope, will permit
inferences to be made concerning the direction ofcausation with greater
confidence that has hitherto been possible.!
The motivation for exploring the supply of gold under the classical
standard is clear. The gold standard is a device that depends on a
privately produced supply of gold to replace deliberate governmental
control of the stock of high-powered money. For the gold standard to
provide superior monetary management, the disturbances produced by
the factors mentioned above should be small and well timed in the sense
that supply-augmenting disturbances should occur when commodity
prices arefalling oreconomicactivityis atalow ebb. Beforeconsideringa
return at the present time to the gold standard, we ought to know how
significant disturbances were under the classical gold standard and
whether conditions have changed in a way that makes such disturbances
more or less likely.
The paper is divided into six sections. Section 14.1 discusses the classi-
cal cost of production or "metallic" theory of the long-run price level
under the gold standard. The section describes how the disturbances
mentioned above would influence commodity prices under a gold stan-
dard and highlights the distinction between random disturbances and
movements along a long-run supply curve. In the last partofthe section I
describe some ways in which the classical theory might be modified to
incorporatethe results ofrecent research onthe economics ofnonrenew-
able resources. Section 14.2 discusses actual fluctuations in the supply of
gold under the classical gold standard and compares them with fluctua-
tions in U.S. high-powered money in the post-WorldWarII period. The
surges in gold production during the middle and toward the end of the
nineteenth century receive special attention. The latter surge, in addi-
tion, is also considered in detail in subsequent sections. According to
section 14.2, it is fair to describe the fluctuations in the supply of gold
under the classical standard as small and well timed.
Section 14.3, which is concerned with the role of discoveries of new
gold fields, begins the survey of disturbances to the supply of gold. The
question explored is whether the great discoveries toward the turn ofthe
century were endogenous, and some evidence is examined that suggests
they were. Section 14.4 discusses the influence oftechnological changes
and whether these changes were responses to changes in the real price of
gold. The major concern in the section is with the origins and impact of
the cyanide process for extracting gold from ore. This process is fre-
quently cited as a disturbance that could have had great impact on615 The Real Price of Gold
commodity prices. This section also deals with annual productivity
change in gold production during the classical period to the extent possi-
ble, given limited data from which to ~onstruct quantitative estimates.
Some judgments, however, can be made, and more recent evidencefrom
South Africa is also presented. Section 14.5 then surveys disturbances
emanating from governments. Both deliberate and inadvertent distur-
bances-thelatter, by-productsofwars andrevolutions-areconsidered.
It turns outthat bothtypes ofdisturbances were moreimportantthanhas
heretofore been recognized and that at least the deliberate policies, and
possibly some of the seemingly inadvertent ones, were influenced by
prevailing economic conditions. Section 14.6 summarizes the main con-
clusions.
14.1 The Cost of Production Theory of the Value of Money
The relationship between the cost of producing gold and the equilib-
rium price level under a gold standard was well understood by earlier
generations of economists including Ricardo (1821, pp. 238--39), Mill
(1871, pp. 499-506), Wicksell (1906, 2: pp. 146-53), Fisher (1922, pp.
99-104), and Marshall (1929, pp. 38-53, 282-84). The gold standard
literature also contains rigorous modern treatments by Friedman (1953)
and Barro (1979). What follows is a briefsynthesis ofthis literature that
highlights the significance of the issues discussed in this paper.
Figure 14.1 displays the basic relationships. Thevertical axis shows the
real price ofgold. This is the ratio ofthe nominal price ofgold (Pg ) set by
the government (the mint price) to the commodity price level (P). The
horizontal axis shows the stock of monetary gold measured in physical
units. At time 1the real price ofgold is determined by the intersection of
the demand curve D and the short-run supply curve at time 1, SRSI. This
equilibrium then determines the price level whether measured in ounces
ofgold (PIPg ) or, given the nominal price ofgold, nominal units (P). The
long-run supply ofgold (LRS), ofcourse, then determinesthe analogous
long-run magnitude.
Before going further, several assumptions implicit in. the traditional
analysis should be mentioned. The appropriate geographical unit is the
set of countries that adheres to the gold standard. The horizontal axis
then measures the stock ofmonetary gold across all those countries, and
thevertical axis measurestheaverage realpriceofgold, conversionsfrom
different monetary units being made at the exchange rates fixed by
convertibility into gold. To explain the movement ofgold among regions
of one country on the gold standard, or the movement of gold between
different countries on the standard, or changes in relative prices among
different countries induced by monetary flows, the classical economists





Supply of and demand for monetary gold.
That need not concern us here. It should also be noted that the figure
depicts stock equilibria. The impact oftheflow equilibria is crucial, butit
is notdepicted explicitly. Finally, thefigure is drawn tofocus attentionon
thedeterminantsofthepricelevel, pushingintothebackgroundconcerns
about the short-run relationship between prices and real output.
Thedemandcurve (D) in figure 14.1 is determinedbythreefactors: the
demand for money measured in nominal units, the ratio of the stock of
gold measured in nominal units to the stock of money measured in
nominal units, and the nominal price ofgold. The demand for money in
theclassical theorywas explained by the quantitytheoryofmoney. Thus,
the D curve would shift to the right with increases in real income and to
the left with increases in velocity. Again, because ofthe quantity theory,
the demand for monetary gold slopes downward because as the price
level measured in nominal units rises (andhence as the real value ofgold
falls given the nominal price of gold), the demand for nominal money
balances rises. Given the nominal demand for money, the demand for
monetary gold would tend to increase with an increase in the ratio of
nominal gold stocks to nominal money stocks. Increases in the demand
for monetary gold resulting from increases in the amount of money
"backed" by a nominal unit ofgold would raise the real value ofgold and
lower the nominal price level. The ratio of the nominal stock of gold to
the nominal money stock was determined in turn by the behavior ofthe
banking system with respect to reserves, the government's regulation of
banks, and the public's preferences with respect to monetary assets.617 The Real Price of Gold
Finally, changes in the nominal price of gold would be associated with
inverse effects onthe demandfor monetarygold anddirect effects on the
nominalprice level. Changesin,the nominalprice ofgold, ofcourse, were
a form ofmonetary policy alien to the spirit ofthe classical gold standard
and were rare during the classical period.
The short-run supply curves of gold slope upward because of the
existence ofnonmonetarystocksofgold-thegoldusedforindustrialand
ornamental purposes. An increase in the real value of gold would dis-
courage the use of gold for other purposes and increase the residual
available for monetary purposes. Shifts in the demand for gold for
nonmonetary purposes-due to changes in fashion, technological
changes in gold-using industries, or changes in government policies-
would produce opposite shifts in the short-run supply ofmonetary gold,
with corresponding effects on the nominal price level. Butin the absence
ofsuch nonmonetarydemandshifts, theexistenceofnonmonetarystocks
would cushion the economy against shifts in the demand for monetary
gold.
Theforegoing analysis governed the attitude ofeconomists toward the
relative variability of the supply of and demand for money. Modern
economiststendto regard the demandfor money as stable andthesupply
as more variable. But the classical economists, given the tie ofmoney to
the stock of gold, given the existence of buffer stocks of nonmonetary
gold, and given the adjustment response ofthe gold-mining industry (to
be discussed shortly), tended to regard the supply ofmoney as stable and ,
the demand for money as more variable.
The equilibrium in figure 14.1 determined by the intersection ofSRS1
and the D curve, however, would be temporary because the long-run
supply curve ofgold, LRS, is lower. With a real price ofgold of (PgIP) 1,
gold mining would be highly profitable. New gold mines would be
opened, lower-grade ores would be brought into production, and pros-
pecting would be increased, with a possible outcome of new gold fields;
other changes leading to more gold, discussed below, would occur. As a
result, the short-run supply would shift to the right. Eventually, the
short-run supply would shift as far as SRS2 and the long-run equilibrium
value ofgold and the price level would be reached at (PgIP)2. The period
between the short-run equilibria would be one ofcommodity-price infla-
tion. Thegold-mining industrywould perceive it as oneofhigh butfalling
profits, as costs thatwere responsive to the generallevel ofprices rose but
theprice ofgold, fixed at Pg , did not. Similarly, a short-runequilibriumin
which the real price ofgold was below (PgIP)2 would give way to a period
of decreased gold production and falling commodity prices.
Thelong-run supplycurve in figure 14.1 is drawn as perfectlyelastic. In
this special case thelong-run pricelevel is solelyafunction ofthe nominal
price ofgold, setby the government (but notregularly adjustedso long as618 Hugh Rockoff
the government adheres to the spirit of the gold standard), and by the
costs ofproducinggold. Changes in the demandfor gold-dueto changes
in velocity, in real income, orevenin the ratio ofgold tomoneyproduced
by the banking system-eould not affect the nominal price level in the
long run. The determination of the price level in this case appears to be
completely divorced from governmental de~ision-making processes. If
there were some slope to the long-run supply curve, perhaps due to the
exhaustion of high-grade ores, then variables influencing demand could
influence the long-run equilibrium price level. To a considerable extent,
however, the determination ofthe price level would have been taken out
of the hands of government.
The long-run classical equilibrium described in figure 14.1 could be
disturbed by a variety of factors that are usefully divided into three
categories.
1. Discoveriesofnewgoldsupplies. The discovery ofan unusually rich
source ofore, for example, might be regarded as a downwardshiftofthe
long-run supply curve. But to the extent that new discoveries are re-
garded as an economic response to a particular value of gold, the dis-
coveries could be treated, alternatively, as movements along a "long-run
supply."2
2. Technologicalprogress in the production ofgold. The adoption ofa
new process, for example, the cyanide process for extracting gold from
ore, would lower the long-run supply curve. In a growing economy one
would want to look at the rate of technological progress in gold mining
relative to the overall rate of technological progress. Again, if techno-
logical progress were endogenous, one could regard the resulting output
changes as movements along LRS.
3. Governmentalpolicies influencing the supply ofgold. Gold mining,
like otherindustries, maybeinfluencedin a hostofways by governmental
policies designed to influence costs and output. Such policies, ofcourse,
have monetary consequences. Through this channel governments can
reclaim some of the influence over economic activity that the gold stan-
dard appears on the surface to deny.
Theclassical theorists, as suggested by the perfectly elastic LRScurve,
did not dwell on the fact that gold was a nonrenewable resource. The
reason is probablythatthe nineteenthcentury, taken as a whole, was one
of increasing supplies, with important new finds in many parts of the
world. In other words, over that century gold in fact had been a renew-
able resource. Forthe twentiethcentury, however, modelsthattreatgold
as a nonrenewable and durable resource may be appropriate. A full
exploration ofthe ways in which such models might be used to refine the
classical theory of the long-run price level under a gold standard is
beyond the scope of this paper. But a brief look at two of the key
propositions from that literature suggests some possible lines ofinquiry.619 The Real Price of Gold
First, Hotelling's rule-that the rent on the unexploited reserves of a
nonrenewable resource owned by a competitive industry will rise over
time at the real rate of interest-has been shown to apply to a durable
resource such as gold as well as resources that are consumed as they are
used (Stewart 1980; Levhari and Pindyck 1981). There seems to be no
reason why the proposition should not apply to the monetary commodity
as well as to durable resources produced for other purposes. The clear
implication is that under a gold standard the behavior ofthe commodity
price level will be described by Hotelling's rule.
Hotelling's rule does not mean, however, thatthe realprice ofgold will
always be rising and thatunder a gold standardwith a fixed nominal price
of gold, the nominal price level will always be falling. Decreases in
extractioncosts atthemarginwould permitHotelling's rule to be satisfied
even with a falling real price of gold. In fact, as Levhari and Pindyck
stressed, the price profiles of many resources seem to have been U
shaped, with a period in which the real price fell followed by a period in
which it rose. Levhari and Pindyck present an ingenious explanation ofa
U-shaped profile, one that does not depend on new supplies oflow-cost
ores. Nevertheless, in the case of gold, it appears that the U-shaped
patterns were due to the discovery of fresh supplies.
Consider for example, the broadly U-shaped pattern that prevailed
from the 1850s until the late 1890s. During the period following the
discoveries in California and Australia, the real price of gold fell as it
followed the decline in extraction costs. Later, as the rich alluvial de-
posits were exhausted and as the ore in the mines exhibited the common
tendency ofgold oreto decline in quality with depth, marginal extraction
costs rose, and with them the real price ofgold. The process then began
again with the discoveries in South Africa and elsewhere.
A second implication of the renewable-resource approach is that the
classical gold standard could have generated an optimum quantity of
money. This follows from the demonstration in the literature that if the
industry that produces the durable resource is competitive-as gold
mining undoubtedly was during the classical period-then the resource
will be extracted at the optimal rate in the sense that the discounted sum
ofproducer's and consumer's surplus will be maximized. This procedure
would have been second best because a perfectly managed fiat standard
could have produced a higher level of welfare in the community. Re-
sources would be saved in the production ofmoney. Butthe point is that
under the gold standard, market forces-one of them being the profit-
maximizing behavior of the gold miners-could generate the optimum.
Under a fiat standard, as we well know, there are no corresponding
assurances that the optimal monetary policy would be followed.
An analogy may be drawn between these propositions concerning the
gold standard and Friedman's (1969) discussion ofthe opt~mumquantity620 Hugh Rockoff
of money under a fiat standard. Drawing out this analogy will serve to
clarify and perhaps reinforce the main points. In that discussion Fried-
man argued that the optimal monetary policy would reduce the marginal
nonpecuniary service flow from money to zero since the marginal social
cost ofproducing fiat money was zero. Since each wealthholder would
equate the real returnonmoney (the marginalservice flow less the rateof
inflation) with the real rate of interest, the optimal policy for a fiat
standard implied a price level falling withthe real rate ofinterest. Under
a gold standard, by way ofcontrast, the marginal social cost ofproducing
money would be positive. With constant extraction costs at the optimal
intensity ofextraction, and neglecting the other costs ofproduction, the
marginal social cost would simply be the product of this extraction cost
and the rate ofinterest (to convert to a flow). This social cost in conjunc-
tion with the wealthholder's equilibrium implies a nominal price level
falling at the real rate ofinterest weighted by one minus the real cost of
extraction.
This result, arrived at by extending Friedman's logic, is precisely what
Hotelling's rule tells us will result from market forces if gold is produced
competitively. Or to look at the matter slightly differently, we can view
Friedman's rule as a special case of the general rule for a metallic
standard, the case in which the costs ofextracting, refining, and minting
the monetary commodity are zero.
These results are merely a part of a full analysis. For example, if
marginal extraction costs are not constant, the concept ofthe social cost
ofadding to the money stock would have to be modified. A full analysis
would also examinethe case in which goldwas producedby amonopolist.
Theanalogouscase in thetheoryoffiat moneyin which the governmentis
typically assumed to maximize the discounted revenues from creating
money has been explored by Friedman (1971) and Calvo (1978) among
others. While the case ofa monopolistic producer ofgold is not realistic
for the nineteenth century, it may be relevant, at least as a polarcase, for
some future period in which we return to gold. Perhaps the examination
ofboththecompetitive and monopolisticcases will lead to a theoryofthe
optimal monetary constitution that examines the costs and benefits of
alternative monetary arrangements under alternative assumptions about
how those arrangements are managed-a theory that contrasts a reve-
nue-maximizing producer of fiat money, for example, with a gold stan-
dard in which gold is produced competitively. These speculations, how-
ever, must be left for future research.
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14.2 The Growth of the World's Stock of Monetary Gold
Before proceeding to the sources ofdisturbances to the supply ofgold,
it is worth examining their cumulative impact. Were the disturbances of621 The Real Price of Gold
such magnitude and timing that the growth ofthe world's monetary gold
stock was slower, more stable, and more elastic in the sense of better
calculated to maintain price stability than what has been observed of
comparablevariables underfavorable moderncircumstances?Table 14.1
provides a tentative answer. It compares annual rates of growth of the
world's monetarygold stock, 1807-1929, with rates ofgrowth ofthe U.S.
monetary base, 1949-79. This is a fair comparison for ourpurposes. The
latter period, although punctuated by two wars, was free from the much
greater disturbances produced by the world wars and the Great Depres-
sion. The U.S. monetary authorities, moreover, appear to have been as
concerned with long-run price stability as managers ofa fiat standard are
likely to be in modern circumstances.
Before discussing the two periods, however, a word on the sources of
the data is in order. The world's stock of monetary gold is from Kitchin
(1930). He constructed his estimates by assuming a base stock and then
adding to it each year the difference between an estimate of world
production and an estimate of the gold used for industrial and certain
other nonmonetary purposes. The derivation may have contributed to
stability of the final numbers. Kitchin's estimates were criticized by
several scholars whose work is summarized by Hardy (1936, pp. 205-7).
Table 14.1 A Comparison of Changes in the'World's Stock of Monetary Gold,
1807-1929, with Changes in the U.S. Monetary Base, 1949-79
Average Standard
Annual Deviation Coefficient
Percentage of Annual of
Rate of Percentage Variation
Change Changes (2) -7- (1)
(1) (2) (3)
World's Stock of Monetary Gold
1807-1839 0.63 n.a. n.a.
1839-1849 1.16 1.27 109.48
1849-1859 6.39 1.95 30.52
1859-1869 2.64 0.64 24.24
1869-1879 1.63 0.48 29.45
1879-1889 1.07 0.42 39.25
1889-1899 2.98 0.93 31.21
1899-1909 3.79 0.68 17.94
1909-1919 3.17 1.12 35.33
1919-1929 1.95 0.68 34.87
U.S. Monetary Base
1949-1959 1.57 2.22 141.40
1959-1969 4.39 1.98 45.10
1969-1979 7.29 1.28 17.56
Sources: World stock ofmonetary gold from Kitchin 1930, table B, col. 1, pp. 82-84. U.S.
monetary base from Tatom 1980, table 3, June dates, p. 23.622 Hugh Rockoff
Thecriticisms rely on an alternative method apparentlyfirst used by Edie
(1929) who constructed estimates of the world's stock of monetary gold
for 1912 and 1928 from estimates of monetary holdings of central banks
and gold in circulation. Edie's figures differed from Kitchin's, showing
that Kitchin had underestimatedworld gold stocks by about 13 percentin
1913 and hadoverestimatedthemby about3percentin 1928, adifference
that materially affected the growth rate between those years. But, as
Kitchin (1931, pp. 69-71) argues, Edie's estimates were not themselves
free ofthe sort of fill-in-the-blanks that make Kitchin's estimates uncer-
tain. In any case, Kitchin's estimates seem to be the best long-run series
now available. Clearly, revised figures would be useful.
The U.S. monetary base-the St. Louis Federal Reserve's estimate-
takesinto account concurrentchanges in reserve requirements thatoffset
or reinforce the effects of actual changes in the monetary base on the
money supply. Tatom (1980) describes the rationale and procedures for
estimating the series. It appears to be the correct measure for compari-
son, if one has in mind a return to the gold standard in which the
monetary base behaves as it did under the classical gold standard, and
governments take no actions to alter the ratio of money stock to the
monetary base.
On the whole, the growth rate of the world's stock of monetary gold
appears to have been slower and more stable in the classical period than
in the modern period. The growth rate ofthe U.S. monetary base during
the past decade was more rapid than in any ofthe decades listed for the
gold standard. Duringthe 1960s the growth rate ofthe monetarybasewas
more rapid thanin any decade exceptthe 1850s when thegreatflows from
CaliforniaandAustraliawere enteringtheworld economy. The compari-
son includes, it should be noted, the growth of the world's gold stock in
the decade following the turn ofthe century when the flows ofgold from
South Africa, Western Australia, and other regions were making them-
selves felt. The year-to-year standard deviations of growth rates also
appear to have been greater in modern times than under the gold stan-
dard, again with the exception ofthe 1850s. Ifthe coefficient ofvariation
is used as a measure ofyear-to-year stability, the overall comparison also
favors the gold standard, although in this case there is an important
exception-the 1970s were a period of high but stable growth by this
measure.
The growth ofthe gold stock was also elastic in the sense that low rates
of growth were followed by surges that brought the average up to a
long-run level consistent with a stable real value ofgold. There were two
major surges. The world's gold stock grew slowly in the period 1800 to
1850 and the real price ofgold (based on U.K. Prices) rose at an annual
rateof1.3 percentperyear (Jastram 1977, pp. 34-37). Growthofthegold
stock then accelerated in the 1850s and 1860s, producing a fall in the real623 The Real Price of Gold
price of gold at an annual rate of - 1.1 percent per year from 1850 to
1870. Growth of the gold stock decelerated in the 1870s and 1880s,
producing an increase in the real price of gold at an annual rate of 1.4
percent from 1870 to 1890. The second surge in world gold production
followed, bringingwith itafall in the realpriceofgold at an annualrateof
- 0.4 percent from 1890 to 1910. Over the long run, from 1800 to 1910,
the real price of gold was extraordinarily stable rising at 0.6 percent per
year. The question is whether these surges should be regarded as fortu-
nate random events that helped preserve price stability (and possibly the
gold standard itself) or as movements along an elastic long-run supply
curve.
14.3 Discoveries of New Gold
The proximate causes ofthe major surges in the supply ofgold during
the classical periodwere a small numberofgreat discoveries. These were
the discoveries in Siberia (1814,1829), California (1848), easternAustra-
lia (1851), western Australia (1889), and South Africa (1886). Table 14.2
arranges the production data in a way that illustrates the point. It shows
the "concentration ratio," the share of the four top countries, in total
output, by decadefrom 1801-10to 1921-30. Italso shows theshare ofthe
four countries containing the new gold fields referred to above. The
dominance of these countries once their major fields were opened is
clear. The data underlying table 14.2 (Ridgway 1929) appear to be the
most comprehensive accounting available, but subject to a wide margin
of uncertainty, particularly for the period before 1850 and for less de-
veloped countries. Here, too, a good deal of fill-in-the-blanks was re-
quired in order to arrive at comprehensive estimates. Ridgway, for
example, shows exactly the same output for Africa in the three decades
from 1801 to 1830 to six significant figures. The largest source of error,
perhaps, was the undercounting of gold that was removed and sold
secretly to avoid government taxes orother restrictions (deLaunay 1908,
pp. 157-66).
Table 14.2 shows that the long-run supply of gold can be described in
terms ofthree phases. Duringthe first phase, 1801-48, the supply ofgold
was dominated by South America (not shown) and the Soviet Union.
Over the period 1801-40 it averaged about 0.5 million ounces per year.
Then, with the discoveries in California and Australia, a shift took place
to a new plateau. During the second phase, 1851-90, production aver-
aged about 5.9 million ounces per year. Finally in the 1880s and 1890s,
further discoveries, particularly in Australia and South Africa, produced
a second shift in the supply ofgold. From 1901 to 1930 world production
averaged about 19.0 million ounces per year.













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.625 The Real Price of Gold
asking how long a country was able to remain among the top four once it
entered the list. Leadership, it turns out, typically was held for a long
time. In the early decades of the century, Latin American countries,
notably Colombia, Chile, and Brazil, were the leading producers. Co-
lombia led the list in the first and second decades of the nineteenth
century and finally dropped from the top four in the 1850s. What is now
the Soviet Union led in the 1830s and 1840s and did not dropfrom the list
(temporarily) until the 1920s. TheUnitedStatesenteredthelist atthetop
in the 1850s as a result ofthe discoveries in California. The UnitedStates
then held first place until overtaken by South Africa in the first decade of
the twentieth century.
Table 14.2 also suggests that the supply ofgold was potentially vulner-
able to politicalshocks. Ineverydecadethefourleadingproducersmined
two-thirds or more of total gold, and in slightly more than half the
decades, overthree-quartersoftotal gold. Inthe periodfrom the Califor-
nia discoveries until the 1890s, the United States typically produced over
30 percent of the world's new gold. Thus, it was possible for policies or
strugglesfor powerthatinfluencedsupply in onecountry, toinfluence the
world's supply.
In short, while minor discoveries, changes in costs, and technological
advances all impinged on the growth rate of the stock of monetary
gold-these influences will be discussed in subsequent sections-the
dominant role belongs to the great discoveries.
The question naturally arises whether in the long run discoveries,
particularly those that occurred when the real price of gold was high,
should be regarded as endogenous. Some evidence is provided by the
record of the local circumstances leading up to the discoveries. In one
important case, California, the discovery seems to have been the
accidental by-product ofthe expansion ofagriculture into the interior of
the state. The Spaniards, who had long resided in California, had taken
gold from their Latin American possessions and even from California
itself, but had not prospected in the interior. Instead, gold seems to have
been discovered purely by accident near Sacramento, according to the
standardaccount, in astreamwhere a damwas beingbuilt (Paul 1947,pp.
36-37). Even here, however, the discovery was not without antecedents.
Goldhad been discovered in the Los Angeles areain 1842 andworkedfor
some years (Morrell 1940, p. 77). Hadthe real price ofgold beenlowerin
the 1840s and this find not worked successfully, the gold consciousness of
the men who made the great discovery in 1848 might have been lower. It
is also possible thathad miners not arrived onthe scene who knew how to
workalluvial deposits, theinitialgold rushwould have peteredout(Dane
1935, p. xiv). But most accounts suggest that in the absence of these
factors, the California discoveries would have been delayed but not
foreclosed.626 Hugh Rockoff
In other cases, prospecting, partly in response to changes in the real
value of gold, played an important role in the great discoveries. The
California demonstration that unworked rich alluvial deposits could be
found in newly settledterritories led directly to an increasein exploration
andto the quick discovery ofgold in Australiaand New Zealand. Blainey
(1970) showed that later discoveries in Australia, including the rich
western fields, were made in response to economic conditions. He
emphasizes the level ofunemployment rather than the real price ofgold;
in his view the discoveries were typically made by men who had moved
from other employments into prospecting in periods of unemployment.
Under a gold standard, of course, the real value of gold tended to rise
during depressions when prices were low and unemployment high, so
these discoveries could still be an element of the equilibrating
mechanism.
The California discoveries also led to prospecting in South Africa
where some gold was found in the 1850s, but there were no major
discoveries until 1874. That find led to an intense period of exploration
culminating in the discovery ofthe main reef of the Rand in 1886 (Gray
1937, p. 30). Increasedproductionin SouthAfricacontributedabout 35.3
percent of the increase in world production between 1890 and 1905. It
may be conjectured that if the real value of gold had been declining
during the long period of exploration, prospecting would have been
curtailed, and the main reefs might have been missed, at least for some
years.
The U.S. finds that contributed about 21 percent of the increase in
world gold production between 1890 and 1905 were the outcome of
intense pro·specting. About 39 percent of that contribution was due to
increased production in Colorado, much of it from the great Cripple
Creek lode. The lode, found by a persistent prospector in a region that
had been actively worked for thirty years, had an ore deposit that was
somewhatdifferentfrom what minerswerefamiliar with and, possiblyfor
this reason, hadbeenoverlooked (Morrell 1940, pp. 164-65). To be sure,
silverpriceswere low, andthatgave special urgencyto thesearchfor gold
in Colorado, but the search might have concentrated on other minerals
had the real price ofgold been lower. The second largest contribution to
increased U.S. output during this period-26 percent-eame from
Alaska. Here, also, the discovery at Cape Nome, which led to the last of
the great gold rushes, was made by a group ofprospectors exploring that
remote region (Morrell 1940, p. 402). Again, it may be conjectured that
without the incentive provided by a high real price of gold, these major
discoveries might have been missed.
These cases appearto be typical. Crant; (1908) examined the origins of
a large number of American gold and silver mines, distinguishing be-
tween those thatwerefound byprospectingandthosefound accidentally.627 The Real Price of Gold
Inclusion on his prospecting list depended on whether the mining jour-
nals reported the relevant information; that list appears to contain vir-
tually every importantfield. Table 14.3 is constructed from Crane's data.
Several conclusions emerge. First, the vast majority offinds were located
by prospecting. Second, while the level offinds did notfluctuate synchro-
nouslywith the realpriceofgold, there is adistinctfillip in the 1890s when
the real price of gold was high.
The evidence is not conclusive, but it suggests that many discoveries,
particularly those that influenced world gold production between 1890
and 1905, should be regarded as movements along a long-run supply
curve rather than as shifts in the curve. The suggestion, however, raises
an importantquestion. Wereconditions in the nineteenthcenturyunique
so that a flow of new finds was possible, or are similar results to be
anticipatedin anyperiodin which gold is the monetarystandard?Insome
ways the nineteenth century appears to have been unique. European
exploitation of natural resources was expanding into regions in which
individual prospectors were encouraged to search for rich alluvial sup-
plies. In Siberia as well as in the United States, Australia, and South
Africa a core of dedicated prospectors made most of the finds. The
conditions that produced that core ofprospectors and the virgin territor-
ies in which they worked cannot be recreated. Some set of institutional
arrangements would need to be substituted for the possibility of rich,
easily worked, alluvial deposits.
14.4 Technological Change in Gold Mining
Various technological innovations affecting industry generally during
the classical period were quickly adapted to gold mining, at least in the
United States. Several large California mines are said to have been the










































Source: Crane 1908, appendix table 1, pp. 652-59.628 Hugh Rockoff
first to install a long-distance telephone line (Kelley 1959, p. 50). Shortly
after its invention, dynamite was first used on California's Mother Lode
in 1868; electric power was first used there in 1896 (Logan 1934, p. 10).
These adaptations did not disturb the commodity-price equilibrium
under a gold standard; they served to maintain a rate of productivity
growthin gold mining comparable to productivitygrowth in the economy
as a whole.
Some innovations were specific to gold mining, including hydraulic
mining, dredging, and the chlorination and cyanide processesfor extract-
ing gold from ore. The first two appear to have evolved gradually from
known technologies in response to the exhaustion of rich alluvial de-
posits. Large-scale hydraulic mining began in California in the early
1850s. Once the richest deposits were exhausted, miners sought methods
to permit them to wash a much larger volume ofgravel per hour. It was
soon discovered that by directing a flow ofwater against a bank contain-
ing gold-bearing material and then draining the runoff through long
sluices charged with mercury, relatively low-grade ores could be worked
profitably. The scale of the largest operations increased steadily. By the
late 1870s, the North Bloomfield mine, one of the largest, had over a
hundred miles of ditches and flumes to carry its water supply and six
tunnels totaling four miles in length to drain the runoff. Streams ofwater
hundreds offeet long fired from cannons called "little giants" were used
to tear away the mountains, and sluices thousands offeet long were used
to collect the gold (Kelley 1959, pp. 47-53). Despite the scale of the
hydraulicmines, however, no new principleseemsto have beeninvolved.
The use ofmercury to form an amalgam with gold had been known since
ancient times, and the process of washing the gravel from the hydraulic
mines was an adaptation ofthe principle the forty-niners used when they
panned for gold. Indeed, a similar evolution from panning to hydraulic
mining occurred in Brazil during the eighteenth century, although not
pursued to the same extent as was later achieved. The main effect ofthe
development ofhydraulic mining was a partial offset to the exhaustion of
the richest placer deposits. A similar account applies to gold dredging,
but in this case the adaptation oftechnologies from otherindustries may
have been important as well (Weatherbe 1907).
The one inn<?vation that appears to have been sudden and dramatic in
character, and was therefore a potentially serious macroeconomic dis-
turbance, was the cyanide process for extracting gold from ore. The
process, sometimes known as the MacArthur-Forrest process after the
leading innovators, was perfected in the late 1880s, with the initial
breakthrough coming in 1886. The essence ofthe process was the use of
dilute solutions ofpotassium cyanide to dissolve gold mixed with certain
impurities and the use of fine zinc shavings to precipitate the gold. The
process was first used commercially in New Zealand in 1889 and in South629 The Real Price of Gold
Africa in 1890. The cyanide process revolutionized the metallurgy of
gold. World consumption ofcyanide was probably less than 50-tons per
year in 1889 and rose to 10,000-tons per year by 1905, with about
one-third of the latter total consumed by South Africa (ClenneI1910, p.
31).
The part to be assigned the introduction of this process in explaining
the concurrent rise in world gold production from 5.8 million ounces in
1890 to 18.5 million ouncesin 1905 is notclear. Kitchin (1931, pp. 57-58),
perhaps the leading authority ofhis time, attributed tremendous impor-
tance to cyanide, claiming that it had increased yield per ton ofexisting
producers by 50 percent and had permitted the treatment of much ore
that would not otherwise have been profitable to mine. His view, how-
ever, may give too much weight to the early experience in South Africa
where cyanide was crucial. Gold in the Rand is found in a finely divided
state throughout the ore, so the ore was especially well suited to cyanid-
ing. MacArthur's (1905, p. 314) memory of his first visit to Rand is
probably accurate. A boom there had petered out as the ores that could
be worked profitably with existing techniques were exhausted. One au-
thority on South African gold (Letcher 1974, book 1, p. 99) refers to the
role of the innovation as "salvation by cyanide."
In other regions, however, cyanide appears to have contributed much
less to the second surge in gold production. Increased production in the
United States was second to the rise of the Rand in explaining the
increased production at the turn of the century. California, long the
majorsource ofgold in the United States, increased production about 43
percent between 1890 and 1905, acounting for about 12 percent of the
increase in U.S. output and about 2.5 percent of the increase in world
output. But cyanide does not appear to have been a significant factor in
California. About one-halfofthe increase in California's outputwas due
to the expansion of dredging. The ores of the Mother Lode, moreover,
were not well suited to cyaniding (Logan 1934, p. 10). Colorado, the
largest contributor to the increase in the U.S. gold production, contrib-
uted about 8.6 percent of the world increase between 1890 and 1905.
Much ofthe gold came as noted above from the rich Cripple Creek lode
where chlorination, the older process, and cyaniding were highly com-
petitive (Crane 1908, pp. 491-92).4 Colorado attained peak output in
1900. In certain other areas of the world that had long been producers,
notably Europe and South America, there were no increases in produc-
tion during the period in which cyanide was introduced.
Further research may show that some of the other new fields that
contributed to the increase in world gold production between 1890 and
1905 were made profitable by cyanide-fields in Australia, which contri-
buted 18.9 percent of the increase; Mexico, which contributed 5.9
percent; and Canada, which contributed 4.9 percent. These three fields630 Hugh Rockoff
were next in importance to the South African and U.S. fields. Tenta-
tively, however, it seems that the cyanide process must be rated an
innovation that had a major impact on world stocks of monetary gold
primarily because of the joint discovery of the main reefs of the Rand.
Strong circumstantial evidence indicates that the discovery of the
cyanide process, like the discovery of some of the major gold fields
discussed above, was the product ofthe high real price ofgold prevailing
in the mid-1880s. Inotherwords, the increasesin production attributable
to cyanide must also be deemed movements along a long-run supply
curve.
Consider first that MacArthur and the Forrests, the innovators, were
engaged in a commercial venture with the object of finding cheaper
means of extracting gold from ore. According to MacArthur's own
account (1905, p. 312), their syndicate was originally formed with the
intention of perfecting the chlorination process. They simultaneously
carried out research on a list of other solvents, one ofwhich was potas-
sium cyanide. Their research was clearly profit oriented; their discovery
was not the accidental by-product of other research, for example, basic
research pn the characteristics ofcyanide. Basic research did account for
the presence of cyanide on their research agenda and influenced their
experiments, but the basic research had been done much earlier.
Consider next that a number of other metallurgists were simultane-
ously studying potassium cyanide as a gold solvent with an eye to improv-
ing the extraction process. The degree of originality claimed for the
MacArthur-Forrest process was challenged in the courts by metallurgists
asserting their o\vn claims; the process thus gave rise to considerable
litigation. One writer summed up the litigation this way: "An examina-
tion of the patents granted for the cyanide processes and improvements
shows that it is an easy matter to obtain a patent, but a difficult matter to
retain it if someone else wants to make use of anything claimed in the
patent" (Wilson 1902, p. 15). The most negative assessment of the
originality of MacArthur and the Forrests that I have found is by Gaze
(1898, p. 5), who maintains that several metallurgists were close to
perfecting the process (himself included) and that the process was well
known in thejewelrytrade. ButevenClennell (1910, p. 23), who believes
that MacArthur and the Forrests were well in front of the competition,
acknowledges that there was one patent, issued to the American Jerome
Simpson in 1865, for a process that might have been modified into a
commercial success had it been tried. Evidently, the extensive experi-
mentation with cyanide in the late 1880s would sooner or later have
yielded a commercially feasible process. It is hard to escape the conclu-
sion that this activity was the product of a high real price of gold.
A similar conclusion applies to the chlorination process that was used
in many regions before cyanide. Chlorination was discovered indepen-631 The Real Price of Gold
dently by metallurgists in the United Kingdom in 1848 and Germany in
1849 (Rose 1915, pp. 300-301) when the price of gold was nearing its
midcentury peak. The German discoverer had in mind the commercial
exploitation of certain gold-containing residues from the production of
arsenic. Thus, the chlorination innovation appears to have been moti-
vated by the high real price of gold.
To go beyond qualitative evidence onparticular aspects ofthe produc-
tion of gold to year-by-year measures of total-factor productivity would
require data directly measuring stocks of capital and labor or indirectly
measuring costs. Unfortunately, the data for most areas, for the United
States in particular, do not appear to be adequate. It is possible, to be
sure, to collect observations on what the industry referred to as working
costs. Janin (1912, 1915), for example, reports data on mining costs,
usually expressed as dollars per ton of ore mined. But these figures
generally omit capital and exploration costs and sometimes other over-
head costs as well. They also show enormous variation from place to
place, as is to be expected. High-grade ores are worth exploiting even if
miningcosts pertonarehigh. Thevariance andtheabsence ofcontinuous
observations on a particular site make it impossible, in most cases, to
construct a usable time series. For an amusing view of the difficulties
involved in measuring mining costs, it is instructive to peruse the replies
to a U.S. Senate Committee which asked various experts to give their
opinions on the cost ofmining silver in the early 1890s. The data offered
were sparse, and opinions ran the gamut from the vew that silver mining
was highly profitable to the view that, if exploration costs were included,
silver was mined at a loss (U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Mines
and Mining 1892).
For South Africa, however, there may be sufficient data on resources
employed or costs to compute annual measures of productivity change.
Some crude measures, tons of ore milled per worker and tons of ore
hoisted perworkerin large mines, are shown in table 14.4. The measures
suffer the problem common to all measures of labor productivity; they
confound changes in the ratio of capital to labor with technological
change and do not deal with the additional problem ofaggregating white
and nonwhite labor. The first and third columns in table 14.4 aggregate
white and nonwhite labor on a one-for-one basis; the second and fourth
columns weight white labor by the prevailing ratio ofwhite to nonwhite
wages. The latter procedure undoubtedly overstates productivity differ-
ences between the two classes of labor because the racial situation dis-
torts the wage data. Thus the two estimates probably bound the true
measure. Despite the weaknesses in the approach, the datasuggest some
plausible conclusions.
The shorter-run movements shown in the upper part of the table
appear to be influenced a good deal by discoveries, particularly the632 Hugh Rockoff
Table 14.4 Productivity Change in South Africa's Gold Mines, 1916-60
Tons Hoisted
Tonnage in Large
Milled per Tons Mines per
Equivalent Hoisted Equivalent
Tonnage Nonwhite in Large Nonwhite
Milled Worker at Mines Worker at
per Prevailing per Prevailing
Worker Wages Worker Wages
(annual percentage rates of change)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
191~20 0.96 -0.73 -0.12 -1.21
192~30 1.37 3.92 2.17 4.77
193~40 1.54 0.42 1.42 0.84
194~50 0.51 -1.16 0.40 -1.39
195~60 -0.10 -0.74 0.51 -0.05
191~60 0.86 0.36 0.88 0.59
191~50 1.10 0.64 0.97 0.75
192~60 0.83 0.61 1.13 1.04
Source: Katzen 1964; tonnage milled, number of workers, and wages, pp. 18, 19; tons
hoisted per workers in large mines, p. 26.
opening of the "New Rand" region which became significant in World
War I. Over the long run some growth in labor productivity apparently
occurred, although at a slower rate than for economy-wide measures.
Kuznets's (1971) survey ofgrowth rates showed outputperworker grow-
ing at 1.81 percentperyearin the UnitedStates, 1920-60, which is higher
than any of the comparable rates in table 14.4. He also showed that
output per capita in a number of industrial countries was growing more
rapidly than labor productivity in the gold mines. Ifone recomputes the
first two columns oftable 14.4 using gold mined, rather than tons milled,
the long-run growth rates are still lower due to the exhaustion of more
accessible ores. Similar calculations for the nineteenth century, based on
a wide geographic area in which new mines were included, if feasible,
would probablyshow higher rates ofproductivitychange thatwere closer
to economy-wide measures. Such a result would have been conducive to
price stability under a gold standard. In effect, the supply of gold was
shifting out as rapidly as the demand, abstracting from other influences,
thus maintaining commodity-price stability.
14.5 Politics and the Supply of Gold
In this section I examine ways in which governments influenced gold
mining, including both deliberate acts ofmonetary policy and other acts
that inadvertently altered the supply ofgold. It will become obvious as I633 The Real Price of Gold
proceed that the real price of gold also influenced the supply indirectly
through its effects on government policies toward mining. Neither set of
influences was a major source ofvariability in the supply ofgold during
the classical period, but both are important because they occurred when
the role ofgovernment in gold standard countries was more limited than
it is today. The history of political influences on the supply of gold thus
provides an important set ofanalogies for understanding the significance
of a return to the gold standard in modern circumstances.
14.5.1 Deliberate Intervention
In the period prior to the discoveries ofgold in California and Austra-
lia, production was dominated by supplies from South America and
Russia. In both regions heavy taxes were imposed on gold mines, but tax
collection varied with the profitability of the mines. Thus in periods of
low commodity prices, when gold-mining profits were high and profits in
other industries low, the equilibrating mechanism was hampered as gov-
ernmentsin those regions attempted to collect shares ofthe profits ofthe
mines. The regimes there found mercantilist policies congenial, so a gold
standard based on supplies from these regions was unattractive.
Thisstateofaffairs 'vaswell understoodbyJevons. Writingin thewake
of the discoveries in California and Australia, he foresaw a period in
which thesupplyofgold would be more abundant, morestable, andmore
responsive to the real value of gold. The abundance and, in part, the
stability of supply were to be accounted not only by the richness of the
finds, but also by the location ofthe finds in regions subject to the rule of
laissez-faire. Accordingly, in the future the supplyofgold would be more
responsive to changes in its real value. To quote Jevons (1884, p. 74):
Before the recent discoveries, no gold mines of value have been in
possession of any Anglo-Saxon nation. They have been chiefly in the
hold of the Spanish and Russian Governments, subject to arbitrary
restrictions and taxes. In English orAmerican hands the production of
gold becomes a matteroffree industry and skill. Itmust follow thatthe
produce will conform more closely to commercial principles; a rise or
fall in thevalueofgoldwill befollowed moreexactlyby anextensionor
cessation of the production. At the same time, the greater area of
production, offering scope for more various competition and equaliza-
tion of local fluctuations, and the greater and more various modes of
consumption, will all tend to render the demand and supply of gold
more equable and its value more constant.
While Jevons was right about the direction ofthe change in the role of
politics, the U.S. and Austral~anexperience were notfree ofinteractions
between politics and gold mining. Perhaps the most interesting U.S.
example was the restriction of hydraulic mining in California and its634 Hugh Rockoff
subsequent removal. In section 14.4, I mentioned the large-scale opera-
tion of hydraulic mines in California during the 1870s. Privately some of
thesemineswerehighlyprofitable, buttheycreatedasignificant external-
ity. The debris they produced moved downstream, ruining farmland and
clogging navigable rivers. The protracted legal and legislative battle
between the farmers and the miners was documented by Kelley (1959).
Thefarmers prevailed. In a series ofinjunctions issued between 1882 and
1884 the courts closed the major hydraulic mines. The battle went on for
several more years, with some operations continuing on a clandestine
basis and othersopenlyin regions where the damage to farmland was less
severe.
The effect on the output of gold from California was pronounced,
although an exact estimate cannot be made. One problem is that the best
sourceofdata(Hill1929,pp. 20, 21) onthe outputoftheCaliforniamines
splices two series in 1883 in the midst of the hydraulic-mining con-
troversy. Nevertheless, a plausible estimate ofthe effect ofthe closing of
the hydraulic mines can be made by subtracting average production in
1885-87, the first three years in which the full effect was felt, from the
average in 1879-81, the last three years ofunrestricted hydraulic mining.
The shortfall amounts to 289,000 ounces per year, about 5.7 percent of
world production in 1885-a small but not trivial effect. This analysis,
incidentally, adds one more irony to the long list of those in monetary
history. A small part of the price decline of the 1890s of which farmers
complained so bitterly might have been produced by those in California
who forced the closing of the hydraulic mines.
To besure, theclosingofthe hydraulic mineswas nota conscious act of
monetary policy. Farmers trying to protect the value of their property
were responsible for closing themines. Monetaryconsiderationsplayed a
role, however, in the early 1890s when there was an attempt to revive
hydraulic mining; the Carminetti Act, a federal law signed in 1893,
established a California Debris Commission to authorize the opening of
mines, provided they had made adequate preparations in the form of
dams or settling basins to prevent debris from entering the water supply.
Inpart, the act simplyaimed tostartup a profitableindustryin aperiodof
depression, a course that might have beenequally appealing with respect
to a nonmonetary industry, although the fixed nominal price for gold
made hydraulic mining a bettercandidatefor aid. Butin part, the support
for the bill reflected a desire to expand the money supply (Kelley 1959,
pp. 271-72). The act's costly requirements for restraining debris,
however, prevented a renewal of hydraulic mining on the scale of the
1870s.
A crude estimate may be calculated ofthe increased production owing
to the CarminettiAct analogous to theestimateofthe shortfallcomputed
above. Subtract average outputin 1890-93, the three years preceding the
act, from average output in 1895-97, the first three years following the635 The Real Price of Gold
effective removal of the restriction. The increase amounts to 172,000
ounces peryear, about 1.8percentofworld productionin 1895-again, a
small but not trivial effect. Thus, this increase in output, and certain
increases attributable to dredging where environmental concerns were
also important, can be linked to the high real value ofgold or at least to
the associated economic conditions. The law was amended again in the
1930s to provide for a federal dam to hold back debris and thus permit
greater hydraulic mining, a response comparable to that in the 1890s in
similar economic conditions.
The hydraulic-mining controv~rsy is the most dramatic U.S. example,
but it is not the only example nor probably not the most important one.
Meade (1909, pp. 112-13) regardedtheextensionoftherailroadnetwork
into gold-mining areas the single most important factor that lowered
private-gold-production costs by reducing freight costs and making the
introduction of heavy machinery possible. As a result, both the United
States and Mexico substantially increased their production at the turn of
the century. Given the long history of government involvement with
railroads in this country and Mexico, an element of subsidy likely was
present and, given the timing of the construction, overall economic
conditions likely influenced the decision to expand the supply of gold.
In eastern Australia, the first region opened, production was initially
based on placer mining. When production declined, the government
imported and worked diamond drills to facilitate finding and working
deep lodes (Jevons 1884, pp. 117-18). In western Australia, the govern-
ment built stamp mills to which small mines brought their ore. It also
introducedawatersystem tofacilitate productionattheKalgoorlie mines
(Mead 1909, pp. 115-16). In both areas, the government probably re-
sponded to output declines resulting from the exhaustion of high-grade
ores rather than to larger monetary considerations. In eastern Australia,
the actions were destabilizing in the sense that they tended to increase
world production in a periodofrising prices, although the gentle upward
trend in prices might have been desirable.
In South Africa, the governmentinfluenced the production ofgold in a
hostofways. Tryingto predictin the midthirtiesthe long-runsupplyfrom
South Africa, Hardy (1936, p. 67) argued that any tendency for the
supply to fall could be offset by actions that reduced the burden ofdirect
and indirect taxation. In his words:
In short, the present level of costs is shot through with items which
really constitute a distribution of the net income of the industry to
elements in the community which are able to grasp it rather than the
payment ofcosts that really have to be met in orderto maintain a high
level of output. Account must be taken of the gradual elimination of
these elements . . . as the industry approaches the time when further
maintenance of production would involve a cost disproportionate to
the return.636 Hugh Rockoff
The costs included direct taxation, which was higher on the gold mines
than on other industries in South Africa (Busschau 1936, pp. 165-78),
railway rates, and even some elements ofwages. It was clear, then, that
the supply of South African gold could not be projected without taking
into account the political response of the South African government to
changes in the value andoutputofgold. Hirsch (1968) documentedmany
of these interventions for later years.
The 1930s, although they lie outside the classical period, provide
further evidence ofthe role ofpolitics. The real value ofgold rose during
the early ·1930s, and world output increased. The largest increases be-
tween 1929 and 1934 were recorded by the Soviet Union (about 3.1
million ounces), Canada (1.0 million ounces), and the United States (0.7
million ounces). South Africa, by contrast, raised its output only by
.07 million ounces. The increase in the United States was attributable to
the working of low-grade ores including the revival of placer min-
ing-much of it panning in California-undoubtedly a response to the
rising real value of gold. The exploitation of new finds in Ontario, also
partlyin response to therising realvalue ofgold (Hardy1936, pp. 58-60),
accounted for the increase in Canadian production. In the case of the
largest increase, that of the Soviet Union, the role of politics was pro-
nounced.
By one account, and given the nature ofthings the account would be a
difficult one to verify, the increase in Soviet output ultimately flowed
from Stalin's judgment that Siberia could be developed more rapidly by
emphasizing gold. Stalin, supposedly familiar with the history ofgold in
California, including the vivid writings of Bret Harte, thought that the
California gold rush had led to· rapid economic development and had
provided the North with an important war chest for use in the Civil War.
As a result, he gave a high priority to the revival and expansion ofgold
production in Siberia (Littlepage 1937, pp. 26-33). Indeed in order to
increase prospecting, the Soviets introduced their own form of the gold
rush in 1933. Private prospectors were rewarded with a lump-sum pay-
mentandtherighttoworktheirclaimsforoneyear. Allpaymentswerein
"gold rubles," a currency that could be used in special stores and worth
considerably more than the paper ruble in which otherwages were paid.
The campaign was apparently successful (Littlepage 1937, pp. 125-31).
In the midst of the Depression, Keynes (1936) argued that communist
efficiency in producing gold might save capitalism by encouragingexpan-
sionary monetary policies. He might have been surprised, however, at
the extent to which the increase in production relied on capitalist tech-
niques.
14.5.2 War, Revolutions, and Strikes
During the decade in which U.S. and Australian supplies dominated
the growth of the gold stock, interruptions due to wars and revolutions637 The Real Price of Gold
did not occur. In earlier and later periods, however, such interruptions
were common. The Latin American wars of independence in 1815 were
associated with a sharp drop in world gold production. World output fell
from 5.9 million ouncesinthefirst decadeofthenineteenthcenturyto3.8
million ounces in the second. All of this fall can be accounted for by the
decline in SouthAmerican and Mexican production; production in other
areas was stable or increasing. It is true, as Von Humbolt (1900, pp.
32-33) argues, that particularly in Brazil, before political upheavals
shook the region, placer-mining output was declining in South America,
and some of the decline may have been in reported rather than actual
output. But it seems likely that the upheavals, at least in the Spanish-
speakingareas, ifnotinBrazil, didleave a substantialmarkonthegrowth
rate of world monetary gold stocks.
The greatest producer of gold toward the end of the classical period
was South Africa. Significant interruptions in the flow of gold occurred
there, the most severe during the BoerWar. Tensions oflong standing in
southern Africa between settlers of Dutch and British descent were
heightened in 1886 when the discovery ofgold in the Transvaal brought
aninflux ofBritish and otherforeigners into a region formerly controlled
by Dutch descendants. The conflict began in the fall of 1899 and was not
concluded until the spring of1902. Aftersome initial Boersuccesses, the
British in the summer of 1900 seemed to win control of the region by
capturing Johannesburg, the center of the gold-mining industry, and
other towns. But the Boers then turned to guerilla warfare and only two
years later were finally subdued.
The impact of the Boer War on the output of gold was substantial.
South African output fell from 3.6 million ounces in 1899 to a mere 0.3
million ounces in 1901. It was not until 1905 that output exceeded the
level in 1898, the last full year before the conflict. The shortfall in South
Africanoutput, however, did nothavethesevereconsequencesfor world
financial markets that one might have predicted, although Friedman and
Schwartz (1963, p. 148) note that there was some stringency in money
markets in the fall of 1899 that could be associated with the onset ofthe
BoerWar. Therewas a stockmarketpanic, andsome banksandfinancial
institutions failed, but the period ofstringency was brief. The reason the
war had so little effect is that the South African shortfall occurred after
several years ofsubstantial increases in the outputofgold. The decline in
South Africa was cushioned by increases in other areas-Alaska, the
Klondike, Colorado, and western Australia-as Clapham (1907, p. 378)
noted. Total world output in 1900, although 18.2 percent lower than in
1899, was still the third highest output recorded up to that date, about
equal to the average of the preceding five years.
The supply of South African gold was also interrupted in 1922 by the
strike of white miners on the Rand. The fall in the purchasing power of
gold relative to prewar levels and the consequent cost squeeze on mar-638 Hugh Rockoff
ginal mines were the basic factors underlying the strike. In that environ-
ment, efforts by the mines to alter work rules soon led to fears that the
color bar was being abandoned. A violent strike broke out that the
government quelled, but South African production fell by about 1.1
million ounces between 1921 and 1922. This decline also was offset, to
some extent, by increased production in other areas; world production
fell only by about 0.5 million ounces, corresponding to a 3.4 percent fall
in the rate of production.
Theseare themostimportantexamplesofinterruptionsin gold output,
but there are many more. Mexico and Russia, for example, experienced
significantoutputdeclines during revolutionaryperiods, andlaborstrikes
in New Zealand hampered production after World War I. The main
point, however, is that such interruptions in supply were rare during the
heyday of the gold standard because of the political stability of the
regions from which much ofthe gold came. It one were contemplating a
return to the gold standard, one would want to know whether such
conditions would again be the norm.
14.5.3 Governments and the Real Price of Gold
These examples suggest that a complete model of the gold standard
would need to take into account the motives that prompt government
intervention in industry generally and gold mining in particular. If gov-
ernment actions with regard to gold mining were undertaken with a view
toward the monetary implications, then they might well be stabilizing.
The measures designed to revive hydraulic mining in California, under-
taken during a period ofdepressed prices and business activity, appearto
fit the case. Such actions, moreover, could well be undertaken simul-
taneously throughout the gold bloc since most countries on the standard
would likely be sharingsimilarexperienceswith respect to prices and real
output. Intervention would also be stabilizing ifthe gold-mining industry
were viewed simply as a particularly promising candidate for aid in a
period of depressed trade and governments were shopping for likely
candidates for aid. Since the demand for gold with respect to its nominal
price is perfectly elastic under a gold standard, measures designed to aid
theindustrymight appearmoreeffectivethansimilareffortsexpended on
behalfofotherindustries. Onthe otherhand, ifgovernmentactions were
tied to circumstances in a particulargold field, there would be less chance
for simultaneous responses. The efforts in Australia, for example, to
stimulate deep-lode mining in the eastern fields after placer-mining out-
put declined fit this case.
But it is not at all certain that government aid to gold mining would be
countercyclical or neutral. Under a gold standard, it should be remem-
bered, gold-mining profits tend to behave countercyclically. Ifthe indus-
try were able to win aid, as many industries do, when its output was639 The Real Price of Gold
depressed by rising costs, and if the rising costs were responding to a
general rise in prices, then such aid would inhibit the equilibrating
process. Such aid, moreover, might well occursimultaneouslyin the gold
standard world. Consider, for example, an inflation. The cost-of-
productiontheoryofthe value ofgold andcommoditypricesenvisions an
inflation brought to a halt by a decrease in the output ofgold caused by a
rise in mining costs. But the process might be inhibited if gold-mining
industries simultaneously won governmental relief that maintained pro-
duction. Some recent events in South Africa and elsewhere might be
interpreted in this light, but I have not found clear examples in the
classical period.
Interruptions of supply that were the by-product ofpolitical conflicts,
as I noted above, were important in certain periods. It might be possible
in some cases to link these interruptions to the monetaryrole ofgold and
to changes in the real price ofgold. So a complete theory ofgold supply
might consider this link as well as more conventional ones. Forexample,
the strategic role ofgold might encourage military actions to control the
supply, often cited as the ultimate cause ofthe BoerWar. In most cases,
however, such interruptions appear to have been random shocks.
14.6 Conclusions
The stability and elasticity of the long-run supply of gold played a
crucial role in the classical analysis of the gold standard. In the simplest
case-a stable and perfectly elastic supply curve-the cost of producing
gold is the ultimate determinant of the price level. Temporary increases
(or decreases) in the price level lead to decreases (or increases) in supply
that ultimately return prices to their long-run equilibrium. The main
weakness in the classical theory from a modern perspective is thatit does
not treat systematically the case of gold as a nonrenewable resource.
Hence, conditions appear to be favorable for a marriage between the
classical theory of the gold standard and the emerging theory of the
economics of a nonrenewable and durable resource. Some examples of
the progeny that might be expected from such a marriage are given in
section 14.1.
From a very long-run perspective, the supply curve appears to have
been stable and elastic in the classical period. Rapid increases in supply
occurred at points in time, at midcentury and in the late 1890s, when they
served to raise the nominal price level after a period of deflation. This
point is developed in section 14.2 in relation to modern changes in
high-powered money. A closer look reveals, however, that the surges
were due primarily to the development ofnew gold fields and to a lesser
extent to technological changes. The question is whether these events
should be viewed as fortunate accidents or as changes induced by pre-640 Hugh Rockoff
vious changes in the real price ofgold. Circumstantial evidence, particu-
larly for the second surge in production, suggests that the discoveries
were induced. Tentativelythen, itseems appropriateto regardchangesin
supply produced by new discoveries at the end of the century as move-
ments along a long-run curve rather than as a series of curves with
arbitrary shifts between them. A similar conclusion seems in order for
technological change. The most famous innovation, the introduction of
the cyanide process, probably had a somewhat smaller impact on the
supply ofgold than has beensuggested in the literature, but it appears to
have been induced by the prevailing high real price of gold. Unfortu-
nately, data are lacking to determine the exact course of technological
change and its dependence on the real price ofgold during the classical
period. Some more recent datafor South Africa areexamined in section
14.4.
Governmental policies represent a third channel through which
changes in the real price of gold influenced supply. Environmental reg-
ulations, for example, wereweakenedin Californiato encourageproduc-
tion in a period of low commodity prices. Purely random shocks from
political sources were rare during the heydayofthe gold standard, in part
due to the dominance ofsupplyby politicallystablecountriescommitted,
to some extent at least, to laissez-faire. During the early part of the
nineteenthcenturyandafterthe 1890s, however, politicalshocks became
more important.
Itwould beunwise, however, to inferfrom thestabilityandelasticityof
the supply of gold in the nineteenth century that a gold standard would
worksimilarlytoday. Certainconditionsthatexistedthenexist no longer.
The regular discovery of new supplies depended on a core of dedicated
prospectors working in largely unexplored areas. Neither that core of
prospectors nor unexplored regions of the same type now exist. It is
uncertain whether a similar core could be created by other means. The
absence of political interference, moreover, hardly seems as likely in
today's world as it was then. Finally, the long and uncertain lags that
marked the supply response hardly seem acceptable in an impatient age.
Notes
1. I am indebted to Richard Sylla for drawing my attention to the significance of the
causation issue.
2. The long-run supply curve referred to here is more general than the one ordinarily
considered. It incorporates, for example, the effects ofendogenous technological change.
3. After presenting this paper I learned that John McDermott had independently
arrived at similarconclusions. Heis currentlyworking ona more sophisticated modelofthe
behavior of a gold standard when gold is a nonrenewable resource.641 The Real Price of Gold
4. In an earlier draft ofthe paper I tried to reinforce this point by referring to evidence
showing that quoted production costs for the two processes were similar. Geoffrey Wood,
however, calledto my attentionthat average (as distinctfrom marginal) productioncosts, as
these figures undoubtedly were, are of no special significance. What matters is that both
processes could compete successfully for customers.
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Comment Robert J. Barro
Rockoff's paper analyzes the reaction ofgold production to movements
in the relative price of gold. With gold's nominal price held fixed-as it
was for most of the'periods and countries studied-we are considering
here the response ofgold output to variations in the general price level.
Rockoff discusses gold discoveries, advances in mining techniques (with
special attention to the cyanide process), the willingness ofproducers to
adopt existing capital-intensive methods ofproduction, and the tenden-
cies of governments either to invoke environmental-protection regula-
tions that hampered mining or to relax these restrictions. The results
suggest various mechanisms by which gold output would respond to
market incentives. But it is difficult to use Rockoff's findings in a quan-
titative manner to assess responses either at the level of an individual
mining operation or at the aggregate level.
Mark Rush (1978) calculated the following regression on annual data
for the 1897-1913period (which hehas beenreluctantto reporthimself):
log(gt) = ... + .31 'log(I/Pr)
(.12)
+ .82 ·IOg(gt-l), 0- = .062,
(.09)
where gt is the world's total gold production for the year (as reported by
Warren and Pearson 1933, p. 197), and Pr is an estimat~ of the GNP
deflatorfor the UnitedStates. Note thatthe dollarvalue ofgold was fixed
over this period, so that the variable I/Pr measures the price of gold
relative to other goods in the U.S. (Standard-errors-of-coefficient esti-
mates are in parentheses-o- is the standard error of estimate.) The
results show a short-run price elasticity for gold production of .3 and-if
one takes seriously the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable-a
long-run price elasticity of 1.7. There are some simultaneity problems
that are not handled in Rush's regression-notably, an autonomous shift
in gt would tend to raise Pt. However, this effect is from gt to theinflation
rate rather than to the price level. The direction ofbias would also seem
to be downward for the estimated coefficient of 10g(I/Pr).
Robert J. Barro is professor of economics at the University of Chicago and a research
associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.645 The Real Price of Gold
Michael Bordo (1981) reports a statistically significant relation of the
world's monetary gold stock to prior values of the purchasing power of
gold. However, his results were not presented in a form that allows me
to calculate price elasticities ofoutput response. By looking at the mone-
tary gold stock-which would ultimately be ofconcern from a monetary
standpoint-Bordo's estimates would also combine responses of non-
monetary stocks ofgold with changes in the outputofnew gold (whereas
Rush looked only at the production of new gold).
Another possibility for quantitative analysis involves the detailed data
that are available on equity prices for South African gold-mining com-
panies. These figures are presented in the book by S. Herbert Frankel
(1967). Frankel uses these numbers only to calculate long-period rates of
return to holdings of stock in gold-mining companies. But we could
utilitze these datato assess the impacts on equityvalues ofchanges in the
general price level, gold discoveries, technical advances in mining, shifts
in government policies, wars, and so on. That is, we could isolate quan-
titative effects Jor many of the disturbances that Rockoff discusses. A
distinction between expected and unexpected events would come into
play in assessing the response ofequity prices to the pertinent variables.
In an earlier part of his paper, Rockoff contrasts the performance of
the gold standard with that of the post-World War II U.S. monetary
regime. He compares the means and standard deviations of annual
growth rates for the world's monetary gold stock from 1839 to 1929 with
that of the U.S. monetary base from 1949 to 1979. In terms of these
monetary-base comparisons, the gold standard period looks good, even
in terms of exhibiting lower standard deviations of growth rates on a
year-to-year basis.
Others who have made these types of comparisons-such as Bordo
(1981)-have examined broader monetary aggregates, the general price
level, orreal variables like output. On this basis the gold standard seems
to provide for long-run nominal stability, but not for stability ofnominal
or real variables on a year-to-year basis. Of course, the short-run be-
havior of broad monetary aggregates and prices under the gold standard
depends, among other things, on shocks to the banking system, on
changes in the velocity ofbroadly defined money, and on movements in
the ratio ofthe monetary base to the reserve stock ofmonetary gold. We
also have to worry about the distribution of the world's total stock of
monetary gold among the various countries. Basically, endogenous
movements in a country's stock of monetary gold may buffer that coun-
try's price level satisfactorily against various disturbances in thelongrun,
but not in the short run.
What should we conclude when we observe a greater year-to-year
fluctuation in a country's broad monetary aggregate under the gold
standard than under the post-World War II monetary regime? Perhaps646 Hugh Rockoff
the comparison reflects other changes-such as the implementation of
deposit insurance for the U.S. banking system-that stabilized the ratio
ofbroad money to the monetary base. Then ifsimilar structural changes
had beenimplementedunderthe gold standard, we might have observed
the relatively low year-to-year variability in the world's monetary gold
stock-whichis studied by Rockoff-carryingover to relative stabilityin
broadermonetaryaggregates andthe price level. A comparativestudyof
short-run variability in broader monetary aggregates and prices may
reflect alterations in banking institutions or other changes, rather than
the shift away from the gold standard.
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Reply Hugh Rockoff
IfBarro'ssuggestions for estimatingvarious regressions may be regarded
as agenda for future research, then I have no quarrel with them. More
information is always welcome. Nevertheless, his exclusive emphasis on
quantification forces me to defend the historical approach taken in my
paper.
The value of that approach is that it allows us to extract information
from a knowledgeoftheparticularcircumstancesthatsurrounda particu-
lar data point, information that is lost when we quantify the data. Mark
Rush's regression quoted by Barro, for example, is estimated over the
yearsin which the discoveries in SouthAfricawere madeandthecyanide
processwas developed. Theimpactofthe discoveries is clearly evidentin
the data that underlie Rush's regression. Should we regard them as
events that shifted the level ofoutputand possibly the supply elasticities,
or should we regard them as a movement along the supply function?
There are, of course, econometric techniques for attacking these issues
that rely solely onthe price and quantitydata. Butwe cangain additional
insight, I believe, by exploring the actual historical circumstances in
which the discoveries· were made. In the case of cyanide, we can ask647 The Real Price of Gold
whetherthe discovery was the accidental by-productofresearch directed
toward other purposes, or whether it was the result of applied research
aimed at finding better extraction methods. In the paper I argue that the
latter model applies, so the case for treating the additional output associ-
ated with this development as induced is considerably stronger. In short,
while I agree with Barro that a quantitative model ofthe supply function
would be useful, I wanttoemphasize thatthe historical approachalso has
a role to play.
Barro cites Frankel's (1967) study of rates of return to investments in
South Africa's gold mines as an additional source of quantitative evi-
dence. I agree that these data might provide additional insights, but two
qualifications should be kept in mind. First, Frankel's data, of course,
begin with the founding of the industry in South Africa, so they apply
only to part of the period I examined, excluding many of the important
nineteenth-century developments. Second, they are based on stock-
marketvaluations ofmining stocks. Forthis reasonproperuse ofthe data
requires exact knowledge of when it was first perceived that a techno-
logical change, orsimilar event, would increase the income ofthe mines.
Beyondthatdate, theimpactoftheinnovationwill becapitalizedin share
prices and only normal returns will be observed. Shareprices, moreover,
are influenced by a host offactors such as the possibility ofa return to the
gold standard-an effect stressed by Frankel-that are difficult to evalu-
ate. In other words the data, valuable as they may be, do not provide a
short cut that avoids the need for detailed historical research to deter-
mine quantitative estimates of the effects of various disturbances.
In the last part of his remarks Barro draws attention to the relative
year-to-year stability of broad monetary aggregates, prices, and real
output in the post-World War II period when compared with the gold
standard period. If we leave aside the problem that the stability in the
world's stock ofmonetary gold that I found may not imply stability in the
monetary base for anyone country, a genuine paradox emerges. Barro's
suggestion is that changes in the monetary system, particularly deposit
insurance, may have stabilized the ratio ofbroadmoney to the monetary
base, and that in turn this produced the greater stability exhibited by
prices and real output after World War II. The implication is that if
similarchangeshadbeenintroducedduring thegold standardperiod, the
year-to-year stability of the stock of monetary gold might have carried
throughto prices andrealoutput. OthersortsofchangesafterWorldWar
II, however, might have occurredthatreducedyear-to-year variabilityin
the rates of growth of prices and real output relative to their trends.
Cagan (1979), for example, found that the responsiveness ofprices to
variations in the business cycle declined after World WarII, perhaps as a
result ofthe higher average rate ofinflation. Ifthat effect or some other
nonmonetary change accounts for the relative stability ofprices and real648 Hugh Rockoff
output in recent times, then the gold standard could not have produced
such stability even with a modified financial superstructure.
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General Discussion
ROCKOFF was generally sympathetic with Barro's comments. He sug-
gested that there exists a great deal of quantitative evidence on South
African gold production, which would be a fruitful area for further
quantitative work on the determinants of gold supplies.
He agreed that whatever the long-run responsiveness ofthe supply of
gold, the short-run supply curve was rather inelastic. Hence, gold sup-
plies provided little year-to-year stabilization of the price level.
MCCAULEY asked how recent evidence suggesting that despite the
rapidrise oftherealpriceofgoldinthelasttenyears, goldproductionhas
declined, squares with the evidence presented by Rockoff.
KOCHIN repliedthatthere is a specificphenomenonconnected.with the
economics of deep mining. If, e.g., there is a permanent increase in the
real price of gold but rich veins of gold are surrounded by lower-quality
ore, an attempt to mine the high-quality ore first, bypassing the lower
quality ore, will impose greater costs later on. Consequently, if it is
believed that the real price ofgold has risen permanently, then firms will
start mining the less rich ore that sits around the rich vein. The result is
that in the short run, though the number oftons of ore mined increases
slightly, the average goldcontentoftheorein ouncespertonfalls andthe
numberofounces ofgold produced decreases. Inthe long run, however,
the supply of gold will respond positively as expected.
BORDO expanded on Kochin's point. He described some empirical
workhe did for the staffappendixtothe GoldCommission Reportonthe
relationship between market-economy gold output and the real price of
gold. Using annual data for the post-World War II period, he found a
negative short-run supply elasticity. However, when he examined a lon-
ger series of data going back to the nineteenth century, he found a
positive short-run response. This response is probably explained by the649 The Real Price of Gold
increased exploitation of intensive bodies of ore in South Africa in the
last fifty years as well as a policy of the South African government to
subsidize the mining of lower quality ore.
FLEISIG suggested a theoretical framework into which the parts of
Rickoff'spaperfit quite naturally-thestandardmodel offinite-resource
extraction.
ROCKOFF responded by pointing out that his paper does discuss this
class of models at the end of the section on the traditional commodity
theory. Some very interesting propositions also emerge from the theory
ofdurable commodities concerning the optimal intertemporal price path
in particular.
CAGAN argued that alternative gold standard rules may render the
policy implications of Rockoffs paper irrelevant. He mentioned in par-
ticular Irving Fisher's idea of a compensated dollar, according to which
the gold content of the dollar is changed gradually over a long period of
time in order to stabilize the price level independently of the supply of
gold.
While acknowledging some problems with this approach, Cagan sug-
gestedthatitwas certainlyworthyofdiscussion. Undercertain conditions
Fisher's rule provides a way to remove any long-run drift in the price
level. In effect, the regime amounts to stabilizing the price level rather
thanthe price ofgold. Ofcourse, this raises the questionofwhetherthere
is any point to being on the gold standard.